In educating students national public school systems use different methods of grouping students by ability across schools. We consider four different school systems of student allocation at different stages of schooling and their educational implications. Our twoperiod model suggests that both frequency and sequence of ability grouping play an important role in producing educational implications. As different households prefer different combinations of school systems, the overall performance of a school system is determined by how households are distributed over income and a child's ability and the voting of households. 
Introduction
In educating students national public school systems around the globe use different methods of grouping (or ungrouping) students by ability across schools. Some countries such as Germany, pre-1960s U.K., China and Singapore adopt selective systems based on school entrance exams to place students to schools; other countries such as Scandinavian nations, contemporary U.K., U.S. and South Korea employ comprehensive systems based on residential school districts to allocate students.
Within the group of countries that rely on selective systems, the starting point of ability grouping across schools varies in the procession of schooling, although most countries adopt mixed-ability schooling in an early part of primary education. For example, Germany first divides different-ability children into different school tracks (Gymnasium, Realschule and Hauptschule) at age 10; prior to school reforms in 1960s U.K. placed children to different types of schools according to ability (grammar and secondary modern schools) at age 11; China and Singapore send primary-school graduates to ability-stratified secondary schools at age 13; Japan employs similar grouping at age 16. In contrast, such ability grouping across schools does not exist in countries that in principle adopt comprehensive systems of public primary and secondary education, although abilitytracking within mixed-ability schools is exercised in some cases (e.g., U.S.; rare in South Korea).
Despite the heated debates for last decades as to whether to group students by ability 2 and from when to group them, educational experts and parents have yet to reach consensus on these issues. Proponents of comprehensive systems argue that the major objective of a school system is to provide equal educational opportunities to all students irrespective of family and social backgrounds. They contend that by giving students rights to attend any school in the neighborhood, education can serve as a method for narrowing educational inequality (Jenkins et al., forthcoming; Leschinsky and Mayer, 1990; Oakes, 1985) . In contrast, advocates of selective systems argue that selective schooling maximizes educational outcomes because it is easier for teachers to instruct groups of students with a low variance of ability and for students to learn with similar-ability students in school (Gamoran, 1986; Lazear, 2001) . They also believe that a selective system is more fair since student allocation is based upon ability alone, not upon family background.
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In contrast to grown interests in school systems of student allocation, economic studies of education are rare that directly deal with educational implications of comprehensive and selective school systems. Even more scarce are studies that examine an optimal timing and sequence of ability grouping across schools in terms of efficient and equitable educational production. 2 Nevertheless, there exist at least four papers that are directly related to school systems by exploring the effects of ability grouping and mixing in education. A selective school system concerns ability grouping across schools; a comprehensive system concerns ability mixing across schools. Benabou (1996) examines implications of ability grouping and mixing of students, arguing that ability mixing tends to slow down the short-run growth but raise the long-run growth. Fernandez and Gali (1999) compare the relative performance of markets and tournaments---ability grouping by a test---in an economy with borrowing constraints. They show that tournaments dominate markets in terms of matching efficiency. Lazear (2001) investigates how educational outputs are affected by grouping methods of different-quality students to show that the total educational output is maximized when students are grouped according to quality. Finally, Hur and Kang (2007) rely on a simple economic model for households' choices on consumption and educational investments to explore varying educational implications of comprehensive and selective school systems for efficiency and equity of education. All these studies are, however, completely silent about when it is optimal to start ability grouping across schools to achieve educational goals of a society. 3 For want of relevant studies, the current paper examines two issues that are of primary concern in the construction of school systems: whether and when to group students by ability across schools. Given that there are in general two stages of public schooling---primary and secondary levels---that produce the ultimate educational outcome, we 3 investigate whether it is desirable to adopt ability grouping and when it is optimal to start (or not start) such grouping in order to achieve often-conflicting educational goals of efficiency and equity. 4 To this end, we extend Hur and Kang's (2007) one-period model to the case where the decisions are made in two periods reflecting two stages of public education before college. In the analysis each of comprehensive and selective systems is characterized by the role of a student's own quality prior to school entrance and the parent's choice of residential district in the determination of quality of school peers. We then compare efficiency and equity of educational outcomes across different school systems by examining educational expenditures, the role of family income and student ability in the determination of the educational outcome, and the variance and level of such an outcome.
Our two-period model of school systems gives rise to several points that have failed to emerge in previous discussions on school systems. Above all, it suggests that not only the frequency of ability grouping in two stages of schooling but its sequence also matter in drawing educational implications of school systems. Given that there are two methods of grouping students (comprehensive and selective) and two stages of schooling (primary and secondary), we have four different school systems in educating students: (1) the comprehensive-comprehensive (CC) system in which the comprehensive system is employed in stage 1 (e.g., primary level) and stage 2 (e.g., secondary level) alike; (2) the selective-selective (SS) system in which the selective system is adopted in both stages; (3) the comprehensive-selective (CS) system in which the comprehensive (selective) system is used in stage 1 (stage 2); (4) the selective-comprehensive (SC) system in which the selective (comprehensive) system is used in stage 1 (stage 2). The first three systems (i.e., CC, SS and CS) are often observed in existing educational institutions. However, the SC system is hard to find. Below we show that the SC system at times reveals more desirable educational implications than the CC and CS systems. Thus the sequence of ability grouping can make differences in achieving educational goals. Second, we find that different households that are characterized by a pair of family income and the child's innate ability prefer different combinations of school systems. For example, households in which the income is high but the child's ability is low tend to like CC but dislike SS; households in which the income is high and the child's ability is also high tend to like CS but dislike SC; and so on. Thus the overall performance of a school system is determined by how households are distributed over income and child ability and how they prefer each school system. Which sequence of school systems is adopted in a nation's education system will be ultimately determined by voting of households.
Third, if the entrance exam in the selective system tests a student's endowed ability 4 alone but never her nurtured ability, then the systems that adopt the selective method in the later stage of education show more favorable educational implications than if the exam tests a student's endowed ability as well as her nurtured ability. Whether or not the entrance exam should signal the endowed ability alone in the selective system will also be determined by voting of households, because different households prefer different settings of the entrance exam in the selective system.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 extends Hur and Kang's (2007) one-period model to a two-period case in which comprehensive and selective systems are combined with different sequences. In section 3 we discuss analytical results of the four school systems in terms of efficiency and equity of education. Section 4 introduces a new setting of the entrance exam in the selective system and examines its educational implications under the four systems. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The model
Let us first set up a utility function of a household that consists of a parent and one child:
where
, and 2 , 1  t .
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Here the household's total utility (U ) is expressed by a sum (in natural log) of period-1 utility ( 1 U ) and period-2 utility ( 2 U ) that is discounted by a factor  . A period-t utility is determined by the amount of private goods consumption ( t x ) and the child's educational outcome ( t A ) at period t . The educational outcome at t is produced by the child's educational outcome in the previous period ( 1  t A ), the average quality of peers in school ( t  ), and the amount of private educational services ( t e ) that can be purchased in a form of private tutoring in the market. 6 The child's time-invariant ability endowed from birth is denoted by 0 A . Now we consider two major school systems that exist in public primary and secondary education: comprehensive and selective school systems. At each stage of schooling, the comprehensive system is characterized by school districts based on residential location. In this system parents choose a school district and their children are placed into one school within the school district. In contrast, the selective system is characterized by entrance tests. In this system students take an entrance exam and are admitted to a school according to their ranking in the exam.
In our analysis of comprehensive systems, we suppose, for simplicity, that student 5 placement into a school is random within a school district, while parents can choose the school district by moving across school districts. 7 We also assume that there is a fixed number of school districts to serve the entire population of students, and that each district is identical in terms of the number of schools and school resources such as class size, teacher quality, etc. Under the comprehensive system, the quality of school peers ( t  ) is exogenously given to individual students once a school district is decided: within a district, students face the same average quality of peers in any school due to randomization.
Nonetheless, parents may choose the quality of school peers indirectly by moving across school districts. The children's quality of a school district is reflected in house prices (Black, 1999; Gibbons and Machin, 2003 In contrast to comprehensive systems, the choice of a school district does not matter in the determination of school peer quality under selective systems, because schools give admissions to students based on the entrance exam ranking alone, not on the school district. Note that the total number of schools and school resources remain unchanged compared with those of the comprehensive system; only school districts disappear in the selective system. In this system parents choose the quality of school peers solely by raising the entrance exam ranking of the child; the quality of school peers ( t  ) is determined by the child's own quality at the end of the previous period ( 1  t A ). That is, the level of To characterize different systems of student allocation to schools at t , we introduce the following model for 6 assigned to schools.
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In sum, a household's utility function at t is denoted by:
And the total utility is given by
Now consider the household's budget constraint:
where t y is the post-tax disposable income of the household at t , T y is its total present-value disposable income, and g is the interest rate of the private credit market.
The price of 1 x is assumed to be one for normalization. All the prices are determined in their own perfectly competitive markets. Subject to the budget constraint, the household, which is uniquely characterized by a pre-determined set of d the choices of which depend on the school system adopted.
The optimal quantities of the choice variables, the educational outcome and indirect utilities are obtained as following:
compare educational implications across different systems. These criteria include the consumption levels ( A . The size of educational expenditure is included as a criterion for a comparison between different school systems, because excessive private tutoring that reduces household consumptions is believed to exist for primary and secondary school students in some Asian countries (Baker et al., 2001; Bray and Kwok, 2003; Time Asia, 2006) , and Hur and Kang (2007) show that school systems are responsible for the presence of such excess tutoring. 
(ii) Comparisons between two different k E 2 's are given as following:
Irrespective of the values of  and  , a household's educational expenditure at period 1 is the largest in CS and the smallest in SC. It is primarily because in CS parents overspend on education at period 1 to equip the children for the entrance exam at period 2.
Such a need, however, does not exist at period 1 in SC. As a consequence of this pattern of educational spending at period 1, the household's goods consumption level at period 1 is lower in CS than in SC. In contrast, the relative size of the household's educational expenditures in CC and SS depends on the values of  and  . If  is greater than a threshold (
, that is, if private tutoring at period 1 is relatively effective in preparing children for the entrance exam at period 2, then parents spend more on education at period 1 in SS than in CC. If  is less than the threshold---private tutoring at period 1 is less effective for the entrance exam at period 2, however, parents spend less on education at period 1 in SS than in CC. In contrast to varying rankings of the two systems in educational spending, the household's consumption level at period 1 is always greater in SS than in CC.
As for a household's educational expenditure at period 2, different rankings emerge.
The educational expenditure at period 2 is the largest in SC and the smallest in CS. Such a ranking is the exact reverse of that for the period-1 educational expenditure. In addition, the period-2 educational expenditure is greater in CC than in SS. One notable pattern of the period-2 educational expenditure is that educational spending is in general smaller under the selective system of period 2 (SS and CS) than under the comprehensive system (SC and CC). Since parents are not able to purchase the quality of children's school peers in the selective system at period 2 given the children's period-1 performance ( 1 A ), they spend less for education and consume more in the selective system than in the comprehensive system.
Given the current predictions on educational spending, it would be illuminating to see if our theoretical rankings of educational expenditures in general agree with empirical regularities. For this, we rely on differences in patterns of private tutoring that is prominently observed in East Asian countries---South Korea and Japan in particular.
Parents in both countries share a similar cultural background and degree of zeal for education, while letting their children subject to school systems that are slightly different at the secondary level of education. At the primary (grades 1 to 6) and lower secondary (grades 7 to 9; middle school) levels of schooling, both countries adopt a comprehensive system based on school districts. In contrast, at the upper secondary level (grades 10 to 12; high school), South Korea continues to employ a comprehensive system but Japan switches to a selective system based on school entrance exams. In South Korea that adopts CC in our terms, private tutoring is widespread over all stages of education up to the upper secondary level; in Japan that adopts a system relatively close to CS, however, private tutoring is pronounced only at the primary and lower secondary levels, while relatively less widespread at the upper secondary level (Bray, 1999) . Direct comparisons of the values of tutoring expenditures at each level of education between the two countries may not offer much insight, however, because each country may have unique educational markets for school districts and private educational services. Nonetheless, the overall patterns of private tutoring at different stages of schooling remain informative to highlight the effects of school systems on educational expenditures.
To the extent that the ranking and absolute size of educational spending may reverse across two periods, a comparison of total (present-value) expenditures between different systems may be of greater interest to households and policy-makers. Proposition 1. (iii) shows that the total expenditure is the largest in CC and the smallest in SS; in the middle, the expenditure is larger in CS than in SC. Given that parents are not permitted to purchase the quality of children's school peers in selective systems, it is little surprising that total educational spending is much smaller in SS than in CC. Notable, however, is that such spending is larger in CS than in SC. Not only does the frequency of ability grouping across schools matter to the patterns of educational spending, but the sequence also makes differences in them. Since parents spend more on education at period 1 in CS to prepare the upcoming entrance exam than they economize at period 2 in SC, the total expenditure is larger in CS than in SC. Such differences in spending patterns across school systems in turn give rise to differences in the role of family income (and student endowed ability) in determining the final educational outcome ( 2 A ). 
Proposition 2: (Gradients of
From Table 1 ,
Propositions (i) and (ii) are trivial. QED
To the extent that a child's endowed ability matters in school peer selection under the selective system alone, it is easy to see that the child-ability gradient 0 A  is the largest in SS, which groups similar-quality students in one school twice at periods 1 and 2, and the smallest in CC, which never exercises such grouping at both periods. In CC, the initial difference in endowed ability among children is reflected proportionally without inflation (or deflation) into that in the final outcome 2 A . In SS, however, the initial difference in ability widens the difference in Echoing the patterns of total educational spending in different school systems, the parental-income gradient y  is the largest in CC but the smallest in SS. To the extent that a child's endowed ability does not function in peer selection in comprehensive systems, the role of the parent's background in the determination of the educational output is the strongest in CC but the weakest in SS. Similar to the comparison of T E between CS and SC, the parental-income gradient y  is larger in CS than in SC, while it is at an 12 intermediate level in both systems. Again, both frequency and sequence of ability mixing across schools matter to the role of the parent's background in the determination of the final output, because in CS (but not in SC) educational investments at period 1 may change the quality of school peers at period 2, which in turn improves a student's educational outcome.
Our theoretical prediction that the parental-income gradient is largest in CC but smallest in SS is in fact in sharp contrast to the argument that comprehensive schooling functions to minimize the effects of family backgrounds on children. To the extent that there exist private tutoring markets outside the public school system, rich parents may exploit these markets to further educate their children. This phenomenon weakens the function of comprehensive systems in reducing the role of family backgrounds on children's educational outcomes. Such a possibility has failed to emerge in traditional debates on comprehensive and selective school systems; our model sheds new light on a hidden aspect of the debates.
If we examine empirical evidence on our theoretical predictions, a rare empirical study by Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) investigating the impacts of student ability on educational attainments across different secondary school systems in the U.K. agrees with our theory; ability has a stronger influence on the outcome in a selective system (CS in our model) than in a comprehensive system (CC). Empirical evidence on the changes in the child-ability gradient due to the changes between other school systems, however, has yet to be found.
In contrast to the evidence on the changes in the child-ability gradient, empirical findings on the effects of family background on educational outcomes are rather mixed.
While Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) show the role of parental background increased with the transition from a selective (CS) to a comprehensive (CC) system in U.K. secondary education, Dustmann (2004) and Meghir and Palme (2005) find selective systems (CS) in secondary education reinforce the impact of family background relative to comprehensive systems (CC) in Germany and Sweden, respectively. Although conflicting empirical evidence demands further investigation, institutional features that are missed in our theoretical model (such as a degree of presence of private tutoring markets) and different empirical measures of the educational outcome may be responsible for such a discrepancy.
In addition to the gradients of the educational output with respect to student ability and parental income, we next examine another measure of educational equity: the variance of educational outcome---) (ln 2 A V more specifically. 
, propositions (i) and ( For the other five comparisons, the rankings fail to be uniquely determined. Since In accordance with the theoretical predictions, rare empirical studies that examine the impacts of different school systems on educational inequality show inconclusive findings.
Using international data sets, Gorard and Smith (2004) 
area IV is those for which
Two patterns are noteworthy in Table 2 for the given values of the selective method; the variance-reducing function of the comprehensive system weakens as  rises, because family income widens the difference in the outcome under comprehensive systems due to the increasing effectiveness of private tutoring. Yet the first pattern that the variance is smaller under the comprehensive system at period 2 than under the selective system holds for all feasible pairs of  and  .
Previous research suggests that  is approximately between 0.2 and 0.4 for elementary and secondary school students (Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Kang, 2007) and that  is between 0.1 and 0.2 (Card and Krueger (1996, p.37) suggests that it is difficult a priori to decide which sequence of school systems yields greater educational outputs. This is in contrast to previous studies that usually support selective systems as an efficient method of student allocation to schools 16 (e.g., Fernandez and Gali, 1999; Lazear, 2001) . Focusing on technological aspects of educational production in consideration of peer effects, these studies in general ignore the possibility that parents may adjust their optimal choices of consumption and educational investments in response to different grouping methods in schooling. If parents optimally respond to ways in which students are assigned across schools, a pool of students to be grouped in a school may be subject to change when different systems of student allocation are adopted in different stages of schooling (e.g., Epple et al, 2002 In line with such theoretical predictions, empirical studies report inconclusive evidence on the impact of school systems on overall educational outcomes. While Kang et al. (2007) show that a transition from a selective (CS) to a comprehensive (CC) system in secondary education significantly increased the average educational outcome (i.e., adulthood earnings) in South Korea, Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) find that school systems fail to yield significant differences in the average outcome (i.e., test score in secondary school), using international data sets. The set-up of the simulation is as follows: A value of 0.4 is assigned to  , because peer effects literature suggests values between 0.2 and 0.4 for the effect of average peer quality on a student's achievement (Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Kang, 2007) ; a value of 0.1 is allocated to  , because Card and Krueger (1996, p.37) summarize that a 10 percent increase in public school spending leads to about a 1-2 percent increase in subsequent earnings; thus  is equal to 0.5; we set all of the prices ) is located in area (1), etc.
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 3 here.> From the orderings of 2 A in the 17 areas, CC is most preferred by the households in areas (1) and (9), but least preferred by those in areas (6), (7), (8), (12), (15) and (17); SS is most preferred by those in areas (8), (16) and (17), but least preferred by those in areas (1), (2), (5), (9), (10) and (11); CS is most preferred by those in areas (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7), but least preferred by those in areas (13), (14) and (16); SC is most preferred by those in areas (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15), but least preferred by those in areas (3) y tend to like SC but dislike CS. In sum, the overall performance of a school system does not only depend on the frequency and sequence of ability grouping across schools. It is also determined by how households are distributed over 0 A and T y and how they prefer each school system. Thus which sequence of school systems is adopted in a nation's education system will be ultimately determined by voting of households. Our analysis sheds light on decisions of households and policy-makers by offering comparisons about educational implications that can be drawn from four different sequences of school systems.
Our analysis also suggests that there always exist conflicts in interests surrounding the choice of school systems, unless policy-makers offer different combinations of school systems in different regions so that households self-select into the most preferred school system. To the extent that policy-makers have to decide over a limited set of school systems in a nation, a nation's school system will ultimately be determined by how they distribute weights to each of educational criteria (e.g., consumption level, the inequality and overall level of the educational outcome, etc) in order to achieve educational goals. The presence of different school systems, as observed in different nations around the globe, 18 will reflect transnational differences in such weights given to each of a variety of educational targets.
Educational Implications When the Entrance Exams Signal a Student's Endowed Ability Alone
In the preceding sections we suppose that the entrance exams in selective systems test academic quality of students just prior to the school placement. Namely, the entrance exam for period-1 schooling tests the level of 0 A , while the exam for period-2 schooling tests (Neisser et al., 1996) . Ferdinandez and Gail (1999) and Hur and Kang (2007) suggest that how strongly the entrance exam in the selective system signals a student's endowed ability relative to her nurtured ability matters for educational implications of comprehensive and selective systems. In this section, we extend the ideas of Ferdinandez and Gail (1999) and Hur and Kang (2007) to school systems of different stages of schooling by employing an (hypothetical) entrance exam that signals a student's endowed ability alone (but not her nurtured ability) for school admission. We modify the model for A household's new utility function at t is expressed by: , which mirror the rankings in consumption levels in section 3. In both periods 1 and 2 the consumption levels are the largest in SS and the smallest in CC.
The levels are larger in SC than those in CS, while both levels are intermediate between SS A , the consumption levels at both periods rise in SS and CS, which employ the selective method at period 2, while they do not change in CC and SC, which employ the comprehensive method at period 2. Since over-investments for A . This can be also seen in patterns of educational expenditures that follow.
Proposition 5: (Educational Expenditures)
(ii)
CS
A alone, patterns of educational spending across school systems remain similar to those in proposition 1. A household's educational expenditure at period 1 is the largest in CS and the smallest in SC.
In contrast to proposition 1.(i), the expenditure at period 1 is always lower in CC than in SS.
The educational expenditure at period 2 is the largest in SC and the smallest in CS; the 20 period-2 expenditure in CC are greater than that in SS, while both being at an intermediate level. The total expenditure is the largest in CC and the smallest in SS; in the middle, it is larger in CS than in SC. Table 5 for varying pairs of  and  . There are six unique areas in the table.
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A notable pattern is that for a given value of  below 0.3, the ranking of (4), (5) and (6); SS is most preferred by those in area (6), but least preferred by those in areas (1), (2) and (3); CS is most preferred by those in areas (2), (3), (4) Similarly, the ultimate decision will be made based on a society's weights given to a variety of educational targets.
Concluding Remarks
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In this paper, using a simple two-period model of household choices, we consider four different school systems of student allocation at different stages of schooling and their educational implications. Our model first suggests that both frequency and sequence of ability grouping play an important role in producing educational implications of school systems. We next find that different households that are characterized by a pair of family income and the child's innate ability prefer different combinations of school systems. As a result, the overall performance of a school system is determined by how households are distributed over income and a child's ability. Which sequence of school systems is adopted in a nation's education system will be ultimately determined by voting of households.
Finally, if the entrance exam in the selective system tests a student's endowed ability alone but never her nurtured ability, then the systems that adopt the selective method in the later stage of education show more favorable educational implications than if the exam tests a student's endowed ability as well as her nurtured ability. Whether or not the entrance exam should signal the endowed ability alone in the selective system will also be determined by voting of households, because different households prefer different settings of the entrance exam in the selective system.
Although useful policy implications can be drawn from our approach, it is not, of course, free of drawbacks. First, the model is based on partial equilibrium, where prices are fixed across different school systems. In the context of general equilibrium, however, the prices vary by the structure of markets. We do not model the changes in markets in response to those in demand for each in different school systems. Second, our education production is based on a Cobb-Douglas form, where peer effects increase with a student's ability (i.e.,
). Such a form of peer effects are frequently used in economic theories of education (e.g., Fernandez and Gali, 1999; Lazear, 2001) . By assuming a CobbDouglas form, we avoid complications that may be introduced by different functional forms of educational production. Nevertheless, there is a need to employ different specifications of peer effects over ability in educational production for future research. 
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Educational expenditure, 
Note: CC denotes the comprehensive system in both periods 1 and 2; SS the selective system in both periods; CS the comprehensive system in period 1 and the selective system in period 2; SC the selective system in period 1 and the comprehensive system in period 2. Figure 1 Area Ordering in Figure 2 (1) Note: CC denotes the comprehensive system in both periods 1 and 2; SS the selective system in both periods; CS the comprehensive system in period 1 and the selective system in period 2; SC the selective system in period 1 and the comprehensive system in period 2. 
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CC SC CS SS        Area II. CC SC CS SS        Area III. SC CC CS SS        Area IV. SC CC SS CS        31SS SC CS CC A A A A 2 2 2 2    (1) SS SC CS CC A A A A 2 2 2 2    (2) SS SC CC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (2) SS SC CC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (3) SC SS CC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (3) SS CC SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (4) SC CC SS CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (4) CC SS SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (5) SS CC SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (5) CC SC SS CS A A A A 2 2 2 2    (6) CC SS SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2   (6)
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